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 Executive Summary 
 
For 6 safety standards issued since 1990, we compare OSHA’s projections of 
their impact on fatalities with actual fatality changes and explain the reasons for the 
differences.  Accurate projection of impacts is important so that OSHA has a good 
understanding of both the uses and the limits of its actions. 
 
We reviewed the preambles to OSHA standards and the Regulatory Impact 
Analyses prepared for them to identify the baseline and the prevention factor that OSHA 
used to project the number of deaths that would be prevented.  We used 3 data sources to 
track the relevant categories of fatalities:  the  Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries 
(CFOI), the National Traumatic Occupational Fatality program, and OSHA’s 
Fatality/Catastrophe investigations. 
 
In all 6 cases, OSHA appeared to overestimate the number of deaths prevented by 
the standards.  The availability of CFOI led to better estimates of the fatality baseline, but 
the prevention factor was always overestimated, especially for standards which 
emphasized training.  Part of the problem is that OSHA is required to assess economic 
and technological feasibility under the assumption of full compliance.  It understandably 
brings the same assumption to projections of effects, despite the unreality of the 
assumption.  We are not able to distinguish here between overestimates due to lack of 
compliance and overestimates due to the overstated effectiveness of the standard.  There 
is some evidence that the projections were more accurate for standards that were more 
costly and subjected to more outside scrutiny.  However, the low cost standards also tend 
to be the ones that rely primarily on training provisions; thus the role of the outside 
scrutiny is not clear. 
 
OSHA needs to invest in developing better methods for projecting injury impacts. 
In some cases, like non-fatal injuries, new data collection efforts are needed.  More 
generally, there is a need for research that will help OSHA understand the likely 






Assessing the Accuracy of OSHA’s Projections of 
the Benefits of New Safety Standards 
 




In the preambles to the safety and health standards that it has promulgated since 
1987, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) projected that the new 
rules would prevent over 2600 deaths per year, about 800-900 from safety standards and 
the remainder from health.  (Mendeloff, 2003)  By any measure, this would be a 
significant public health achievement.  Questions have naturally arisen about the 
accuracy of these projections.  The issue of accuracy is important for outside evaluators, 
but it is also important for the agency itself.  Major mistakes may lead to giving priority 
to the wrong hazards.  For example, too high an estimate of effectiveness may lead to a 
judgment that a hazard has been adequately addressed when it has not been.  Too low an 
estimate of effectiveness or too high an estimate of costs may reduce the priority given to 
a rule in the regulatory development process.  To improve the process of priority setting, 
we need to pay attention to the quality of the projections that regulatory agencies make. 
The costs and benefits of federal government safety and health standards have 
been extensively reviewed by analysts interested in the effectiveness and efficiency of 
government regulation (Morrall, 1986; Mendeloff, 1988; Hahn, 1996, Heinzerling, 1998).  
The source of the estimates has generally been the information provided by federal 
regulatory agencies.  A series of federal executive orders have required agencies  to 
produce these estimates since the late 1970s for regulations imposing annual costs above 
$100 million. 
On the cost side, a small number of retrospective studies have been conducted 
(Harrington et al, 1999).  They have found cases where costs had been overestimated as 
well as cases where costs had been underestimated, although the former are more 
common. Agencies rely primarily on data supplied by the industries that will be 
regulated.  Although not all firms in an industry have the same expected gains or losses 
from regulation, in general we expect that firms have an interest in establishing that 





of the low-cost opportunities for reducing hazards, but may discover more of them once 
they decide that they must comply. On the other hand, the regulatory agency has an 
incentive to make the standard appear as attractive as possible in order to undercut 
potential challenges. 
Studies of the accuracy of the estimates of regulatory benefits are less common.  
For health hazards, we could examine changes in the number of workers exposed to 
different concentrations to find out whether the standard had been effective.  However, 
for hazards with long latency periods, we could not easily assess whether the projected 
reduction in diseases had occurred.  
Estimating the actual effects of safety standards seems more straightforward.   It 
should be possible to observe whether the ex ante estimate of the change in fatal or non-
fatal injuries was on target.  Of course, even if we can observe these changes, we must try 
to answer the key evaluation question:  what would have happened in the absence of the 
new standard?  Do the changes we observe represent the impact of the standard or do the 
impacts of other factors need to be accounted for? 
  A few retrospective studies of the effects of individual OSHA safety standards 
have been carried out.  A 1995 report by the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, 
examined the validity of the techniques used for estimating the costs of OSHA standards.  
It noted that two safety standards had not been implemented as extensively as OSHA had 
projected.  In compliance with the “look-back” provision of the 1995 Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement and Fairness Act, OSHA has completed studies on two safety 
standards, the grain handling standard (OSHA, 2003) and the “lockout-tagout” standard 
(OSHA, 2000).  Another study examined the effects of the OSHA trench and excavation 
standard (Suruda, et al. 2002).  However, none of these last 3 studies attempt to compare 
the effects with the projections OSHA’s made at the time the standard was promulgated. 
This paper presents a more systematic attempt to compare the ex ante projections 
with ex post estimates of the effects of OSHA’s safety standards. We use longitudinal 
data from different sources and have begun with the most recent standards for which 
enough time has elapsed to merit an evaluation.  
  We believe it is important not only to identify whether the predictions of impact 
have been accurate, but also to learn the reasons for major errors in order to be able to 





not very useful for predicting the impacts of new standards.  In that event, it would be 
important to examine whether better data could be made available.  We should also 
emphasize that, in this paper, we are interested in the existence and magnitude of errors, 
but are not attempting the more difficult task of estimating the precise effects of the 
standards, much less the task of assessing their costs and benefits. 
 
2. Materials and Methods 
 
  Our comparison of the actual and projected numbers of injuries prevented by the 
standards involved several steps.  We obtained a list of all OSHA safety standards from 
its Office of Regulatory Analysis.  To limit the size of the task and to make it more 
relevant to current practices, we look only at the eleven standards promulgated since 
1990.  (See Table I)   We omitted the three most recent standards, which had been 
promulgated after 1996, on the grounds that there may not have been enough time to 
track their effects.  That left eight standards.  We reviewed the preambles to these rules as 
they appeared in the  Federal Register at the time of promulgation.  The preambles 
present the conclusions of the studies on the expected costs and safety effects of the 
standards.  On the basis of the information in the preambles, we excluded additional 
standards. 
  As we explain below, the data available for tracking fatal injuries is much better 
than the data available for tracking non-fatal injuries.  On this basis we excluded:  a) the 
1994 rule for Personal Protective Equipment for General Industry, which OSHA had 
projected would prevent 4 deaths per year; and b) the 1990 rule on Stairways and Ladders 
in Construction, which OSHA had projected would prevent 3 deaths per year.  As the 
data in Table II indicate, the standards we are examining were all projected to prevent at 
least 40 deaths per year. 
  We a lso excluded the 1994 standard on fall prevention in construction.  
Addressing primarily falls from roofs and through floors in new construction, the new 
provisions of this standard were projected to prevent 22 fatalities per year.  In addition, 
OSHA projected that full compliance with the existing standard would prevent another 57 





only about a 15% reduction, a change that could be difficult to discern, relative to other 
standards with larger absolute and percentage reductions. 
  The omission of these 3 standards and the focus on standards with relatively large 
projected effects may make it less likely that we find cases where the effects are 
underestimated.  However, although this is important to note, we believe that a focus on 
cases with bigger estimated effects is justified in a study of OSHA’s accuracy:  the 
importance of the error is larger if a projection of 60 deaths prevented is wrong by a 
factor of 2 than if a projected effect of 3 deaths is wrong by a factor of 2.   
The published preambles for the six remaining standards often failed to clearly 
explain how the estimates of safety effects were made.  Which data sources were used to 
establish the baseline?  How did O SHA estimate what the reductions in deaths and 
injuries would be?  In order to find the answers, we also examined the Regulatory Impact 
Analyses (RIAs) that OSHA prepared for these standards.  Although White House 
Executive Orders require RIAs only when the expected annual impacts exceed $100 
million annually, OSHA has regularly made estimates of both the expected effects and 
the expected costs.  The latter are required as evidence of the “economic feasibility” of a 
standard.  The former usually helps to establish that other legal requirements are met:  
that a standard addresses a “significant risk” and that it is “reasonably necessary.”  We 
obtained and reviewed RIAs for each of the standards we report on here as shown in 
Table 2. 
  On the basis of the preambles and the RIAs, we identified several pieces of 
information which were important for our attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
standards.  These items included: 
•  The effective date for compliance with the standard 
•  Whether the standard was expected to affect all states equally, or whether some 
states already had comparable standards in place 
•  Which industries (SICs) would be affected by the standard 
•  Which injury types would be affected (Injury type could include not only the 
causal “event,” but, depending on the data available, also the nature of injury, part 









For fatal injuries, we looked at three different data sets:  the Census of Fatal 
Occupational Injuries (CFOI), the National T raumatic Occupational Fatality data 




  The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) carried out this census for the first time for 
deaths occurring in 1992.  It covers all cases in which the decedent was working for pay 
or profit at the time of the event in a legal work activity or was present at the site as a 
requirement of the job.  Multiple sources are examined to identify occupational fatalities.  
To be included, a case must be verified from two independent source documents or from 
a source document and a follow-up questionnaire.  About 30 data elements are collected.  
Cells with fewer than 5 cases are not reported. 
 
NTOF 
  Beginning with 1980 data, the National Institute  of Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) has collected death certificates from all states for workers 16 years and 
older for whom an external cause of death was noted and where the certificate gave a 
positive answer to the “Injury at Work?” item.  The death certificate is supposed to list 
the “usual” industry and occupation of the decedent.  Errors in this coding, however, 
appear to occur in 25-40% of cases.  The main information on the cause of death comes 




  Employers are supposed to report fatalities and some multi-hospitalization events 
to OSHA by telephone within 24 hours of the event.  OSHA usually investigates if it has 
reason to believe that a violation of a safety and health standard might be involved.  (For 
that reason, the FAT/CAT data do not include deaths due highway motor vehicle 





early 1997, a text version of the event has been maintained in OSHA’s information 
system (IMIS), although the last year or two of data are obviously not as complete as 
earlier years.  Key words can be used to retrieve particular types of injury events.   Since 
mid-1990 inspection data from all states has been entered into IMIS. California did not 
participate before July 1987, left again in June 1989 and then returned in July 1990.  
Washington State began submitting data in January 1990. Michigan health reports began 
in October 1988; safety reports, in October 1989. (OSHA, 1993 RIA).  Because of these 
late entrants, we have adjusted the FAT/CAT numbers before 1991 upward on the basis 
of the population in those states (6% in 1990, 10% in 1989 and 5% in 1988, 11% in 1987, 
17% in 1986 and earlier). 
 
Non-fatal Injuries 
  For non-fatal injuries, we looked at the Survey of Occupational Injuries and 
Illnesses, conducted annually by BLS.  Prior to 1992, the Survey provided no information 
about the characteristics of injuries, other than whether they involved days away from 
work, only restricted work activity, or nothing more than medical care.  The Survey also 
collected information about the estimated duration of injuries with days away from work.  
Beginning in 1992, the Survey began to collect additional information about the subset of 
injuries which involved days away from work.  The number of these injuries has been 
declining steadily since 1990, largely because employers have increasingly adopted 
return to work policies that substitute “restricted work activity” for time away from work. 
  As the description of data sources above suggests, we have considerably better 
ability to track fatal than non-fatal injuries.  It also turns out that, according to OSHA’s 
projections, these standards would have a disproportionate impact on fatal injuries.  Thus, 
for the private sector as a whole, there are about 6,000 acute fatalities per year and about 
2 million lost workday injuries, a ratio of 333 non-fatal injuries for each fatality.  In 
contrast, the baselines of the standards reviewed here have a median ratio of 123 injuries 
per fatality. Also, OSHA concluded that the prevention rate for fatalities would be at least 
as high, if not higher, than for non-fatal injuries.  In the analyses that follow, we limit our 








In order to track injuries, we first identified the industries that, according to 
OSHA, were covered by the new standards and the effective date of the standards.  Next, 
for all except the Logging Operations standard, we identified the injury types that the 
standards were projected to affect.  As described below, we were not always able to track 
each effect.  For the logging, confined spaces, and process safety management (PSM) 
standard, we were able to take advantage of the partial coverage of the standard to 
compare changes in fatalities in states covered by the new standard and states covered by 
earlier standards.  In light of the limited number of annual observations we do not apply 
statistical tests to the differences we find.  We did estimate the effect of cyclical changes 
(as measured by changes in the unemployment rate) or changes in the economy-wide 
fatality rate (as measured by NTOF and the Current Population Survey).  On average, a 1 
point drop in the unemployment rate raised the fatality rate by 0.1 point, an increase of 




We discuss the standards in chronological order. 
Electrical Work Practices for General Industry 
  The electrical standard for general industry became effective in late 1990.  OSHA 
estimated that the first year costs would be $75 million, followed by recurring costs of 
$20 million per year.  It projected that the standard would prevent 97 fatalities per year. 
OSHA’s baseline figure for electrical deaths in general industry was 235 per year.  Thus 
the reduction of 97 would constitute a 41% reduction. 
 
Baseline  
  The baseline estimate came from an estimate of the number of electrocution 
deaths reported for general industry in the BLS Annual Survey of Occupational Injuries 
and Illnesses for 1980-84.  This was extrapolated to the figure of 235 for 1985.
1  (OSHA, 
1987)  In the final standard, OSHA explicitly excluded coverage for SICs 491 and 493 
                                                 





(the industries addressed by the later Electrical Power Generation standard), which would 
lead to a somewhat lower baseline. 
We made an effort to construct an estimate of what the number of deaths before 
1992 had been.  In that year, CFOI became available, providing more accurate 
information.  Figure 1 shows trends from all 3 data systems for private industry, except 
agriculture and construction, and (except for NTOF) without SICs 491 and 493.  For 
CFOI the category is “contact with electric current.”  For FAT/CATs it is the keyword 
“electrical.”  For NTOF, it is deaths with E-codes 925.2 and 925.9.  For the years from 
1992 through 1995, we can compare the CFOI and FAT/CAT estimates.  The CFOI 
numbers were, on average, 25% higher.  We used this adjustment figure, along with the 
adjustment for missing data in FAT/CATs because some states did not contribute data 
before 1991.  Based on these “adjusted FAT/CAT” figures, we estimate that there were 
about 135 deaths in 1985.  This is well below the OSHA baseline of 235; less than half of 
the difference can be accounted for by the exclusion of SIC 491 and 493.  (We report 
below that there were never more than 30 deaths per year with the keyword “electrical” 
for SICs 491 and 493 in the FAT/CAT system.  Even after we adjust this upward for 
missing states and for the potential 25% underreporting, the number is less than 50.) 
 
Prevention Factor 
  OSHA’s contractor estimated that 89% of all electrical injuries in general industry 
would be covered by the standard; that 75% of all injuries “are not due to faulty 
equipment but are related to work practices;” and that the fraction of workers exposed to 
fatality risks who would undergo training required by the standard  would be 73%.  
Finally, OSHA estimated that 85% of all electrical injuries “are not caused by human 
error and are therefore amenable to regulation.”  (OSHA, 1987)   Multiplying these 4 
percentages together, OSHA arrived at a predicted reduction in fatal injuries of 41.4%.   
The logic for the last step in this calculation is hard to follow.  The major 
provision of the new standard, at least in terms of cost, called for training workers.  It is 
not evident why training would be useful unless many injuries had been caused by 
“human error.” 
Nevertheless, if we look for the 41% predicted drop, what do we find?  The 





baseline (because the standard became effective in December of that year), we don’t find 
any noticeable reduction until 1995.  However, there was an unusually steep drop in 
deaths from 1988 to 1989 as well as further drops after 1994. 
In order to see whether changes in employment might have accounted for the 
changes we see, we also calculated the rate for electrical fatalities, using CFOI data for 
the numerator and employment data from County Business Patterns for the denominator.  
We calculated the fatality rate in each industry sector in 1992 and then calculated what 
the f atality rate for all of general industry would have been in subsequent years if the 
distribution of employment among sectors had remained as it had been in 1992.  The 
resulting changes were not much different than those shown for the changes in the 
number of deaths and are not shown here.  
Figure 1 shows clearly that the overall reduction in fatalities from the mid-1980s 
to the late 1990s was large—from an average of 151 in 1985-88 to an average of 78 in 
1997-2000, down 48%.  Given the timing of the reductions, it seems unlikely that the 
OSHA rule can claim the major credit for this drop, although some role is certainly 
possible.  However, since the baseline for this calculation is considerably lower than the 
baseline used by OSHA, the actual number of deaths prevented, even assuming a causal 
role for the standard, was also considerably lower than the 97 deaths projected by OSHA. 
 
Process Safety Management (PSM) in General Industry 
  Triggered in part by the disaster at the Union Carbide chemical plant in Bhopal, 
India, the PSM standard called for firms to adopt procedures to reduce the risk of releases 
and explosions involving chemicals and other dangerous materials.  According to the 
RIA, implementation “will prevent the occurrence, and minimize the consequences, of 
significant releases of toxic substances, as well as fires, explosions and other types of 
catastrophic accidents.”  
For this standard, the RIA noted clearly that “OSHA excluded from this final 
impact analysis establishments in California, Delaware, and New Jersey, where process 
safety management statutes have already been enacted.  In these three states the 
compliance burden is unaffected by the federal rule.”  Excluding these states, OSHA 
estimated that the new standard would cost $889 million and prevent 132 deaths during 





$406 million while the deaths prevented would double to 264.  The impact was expected 
to grow because the proportion of establishments that  had completed their self-audits 
would grow over the first 5 years.  The standard became effective toward the end of May, 
1992.   
 
Baseline 
  OSHA reviewed FAT/CATs from 1983-1990 in the industries covered by the 
standard.  It found 1,712 fatalities “related to process hazards covered under the OSHA 
standard.”  Next, OSHA adjusted this number upward by a factor of 1.54, due to expected 
underreporting of FAT/CATs.  The result was an average of 330 per year from 1983-
1990.  
The major problem with the procedure is found in the first step.  OSHA said that 
“cases were extracted from the [FAT/CAT] data base in which the source of injury, the 
type of event, the environmental factor involved, or the human factor involved could be 
directly linked to the absence of process safety management.” 
The use of the word “or” here is crucial.  For example, the two “event codes” used 
were “inhalation” and “absorption.”  But, to be included, an accident did not have to 
include them.  It might only have involved one of the “human factor” codes that were 
judged to be “related” to the standard.  These included: 
 
•  Misjudgment of hazardous situation 
•  Safety devices removed or inoperative 
•  Procedure for handling materials not appropriate to task 
•  Defective equipment, knowingly used 
•  Insufficient or lack of engineering controls 
•  Insufficient or lack of written work practices programs. 
 
It seems evident that these human factors could be present even when an accident has 
nothing at all to do with chemicals or with explosions.  The two other types of codes add 
even further to the list of “related” accidents. 
Yet OSHA did observe that the estimates it made were in the range of figures 





Survey’s estimates of deaths have limited reliability, most of the criticisms suggested the 
numbers were too low.  (National Research Council, 1987)   We reviewed the FAT/CATs 
since 1985.  As Figure 2 shows, the annual number of deaths elicited by citing the 
keywords “explosion” and “electrical” never totaled more than about 120.  Although 
these categories do not capture all of the deaths related to the PSM standard, they do 
include some that are not related—e.g., explosions of tire rims.  The figures from 1992 
through 1995, when we have both FAT/CAT and CFOI data, suggest that the earlier 
FAT/CAT data may have accurately counted this category of deaths, and thus that the 
adjustment OSHA made to account for underreporting may have been excessive.   
  
Prevention Factor 
  For its estimate of the prevention role that the new standard would play, OSHA 
relied on one of its contractors, who concluded a study of the chemical and petroleum 
industries with the statement that “60 percent of the fatalities that occurred in 
establishments with some elements of a [process safety management] program could 
have been prevented and 80 percent of the fatalities that occurred in establishments with 
no program could have been prevented.”   A different contractor “identified a range of 16 
to 56 percent reduction in both injuries and fatalities following the implementation of the 
OSHA standard.”   
OSHA also noted that a well-known organization representing many of the 
nation’s largest firms had stated that “Experience by ORC member companies indicates 
that most, if not all, process-related incidents involve a breakdown of one or more of 
OSHA’s Process Safety Management elements.  Given effective implementation and 
compliance with the provisions of the proposed standard, we agree with OSHA’s 
estimate of at least an 80% reduction in serious process incidents.”   
What has actually happened to deaths since the standard took effect?  In Figure 2, 
we tracked the industries that OSHA identified as the sites of PSM-related deaths for all 3 
of the major event types—explosions, fires, and inhalation (other than confined spaces).  
Certainly the experience since 1992 is not consistent with even a 40% reduction, much 
less an 80% drop.  Another piece of evidence is that the fatality trends are similar in the 3 





However, the FAT/CAT data (for all states) do indicate that a substantial drop 
occurred from 1991 to 1992.  It is possible that some of this represents an anticipatory 
effect or an effect that began when the standard was promulgated in February, 1992.  
(1992 was a recession year, but the size of the change is far beyond anything that could 
be explained primarily by changes in employment.)  However, the RIA, which projected 
a 40% average decrease in deaths for the first 5 years and an 80% decrease for the next 5 
years, clearly contemplated a steadily increasing preventive effect as more firms carried 
out their self-audits.   
In conclusion, it is highly implausible that the PSM standard will have prevented 
264 deaths (80% of 330) by the 10
th anniversary of the standard. 
 
Permit-Required Confined Spaces for General Industry 
The safety standard for preventing injuries in confined spaces became effective in 
April, 1993. The general industry confined spaces standard is designed to protect entrants 
in confined spaces from serious hazards, primarily those due to toxic or asphyxiating 
atmospheres. (Some other injury types were included, e.g., deaths due to engulfment.) 
The annualized compliance cost was projected at $ 202.4 million.  
 
Baseline 
OSHA estimated an annual baseline of 63 fatalities in workplaces affected by this 
standard.  For fatalities, this baseline was based upon a review of FAT/CATs from 1986-
1990, which found 32 deaths in the affected industries.  OSHA doubled this number to 
attempt to adjust both for underreporting and for the failure of some states to report to the 
IMIS.   
Although doubling the FAT/CAT numbers usually tends to lead to overestimates, 
a 1994 study by NIOSH, drawing from its NTOF data base, identified 670 cases over the 
10 years from 1980-89 that it classified as occurring in “confined spaces.”  Over half of 
the cases involved atmospheric hazards, although “engulfment in loose material” 
accounted for one-third.  This average of 67 per year is close to the figure that OSHA 








OSHA’s RIA noted that six states—California, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, 
New Jersey, and Virginia—currently had permit entry rules for confined spaces.  It 
judged that “Despite the increased protectiveness provided by the state permit 
programs… OSHA believes that this federal standard will provide the needed additional 
protection to employees in these states and throughout the nation.”  Although OSHA did 
not omit these states from its calculations of benefits or costs, the implication here is that 
the impact in these states should be less because of their “increased protectiveness.” 
OSHA applied an 85% prevention rate to its baseline number, leading to a 
projected reduction of 54 fatalities.  OSHA justified this prevention factor on the grounds 
that:  a) some firms seemed to have eliminated these accidents, b) several respondents 
agreed that an 85% reduction seemed achievable, and c) OSHA had used similar 
prevention factors in other safety RIAs. 
   In CFOI, we identified two event types which include most of the atmospheric 
deaths affected by the standard:  “inhalation in enclosed, restricted, or confined spaces,” 
and “depletion of oxygen in enclosed, restricted, or confined spaces.”  The sum of these 
two from CFOI for 1992 for general industry in all states was 38.  For evaluating the 
effect of this standard, we used the two categories to compare confined space related 
fatalities in the 6 states which OSHA had stated would be less affected because of their 
existing standards with the effects in the other 44 states. 
Figure 3 shows that from 1992 to 1993, the year the standard became effective, 
deaths dropped from 31 to 24 in the states that we judged more affected by the standard, 
and from 7 to 3 in the other six states.  The trends in both groups of states continued to be 
quite similar through 2001.  From the 38 total private sector deaths in CFOI in 1992, the 
maximum drop came in 1999 with 12 deaths, a 68% reduction. 
The reduction in deaths in confined spaces has been impressive and the OSHA 
standard may have contributed substantially.  The main qualm is the equal or greater 
decline in those states that we expected to be less affected by the standard.  Although it 
seems unlikely that deaths fell 85% (54 deaths) in response to the standard, a greater than 






Electrical Power Generation  
     The electrical power generation standard, effective at the end of May 1994, 
applied primarily to the power generating industry (SICs 491 and 493).  Although 
electrical injuries, like contact with electric current (CFOI event code 31X), dominate the 
expected fatality benefits, OSHA’s estimates also included a broader set of event 
categories.  OSHA stated that the baseline number of fatalities was 85.5 and it said that 
compliance with the final standard would prevent 59 of them, a 68% prevention rate.   
OSHA derived the baseline here from several sources.  First it looked at the 
annual average of fatal injuries in these two SICs that had been reported as FAT/CATs 
from 1988 to 1992.  It doubled this number (from 39 to 78) in an attempt to take account 
of potential underreporting.  OSHA also used the newly available CFOI data, which 
reported 53 private sector deaths for SICs 491 and 493 in 1992.
2   
To estimate preventability, OSHA relied heavily on data collected by the 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, which indicated that 68% of the deaths 
in the electric utility industry would be preventable by full compliance with the new 
standard. 
Our evaluation tracks deaths only in SIC 491 and 493.  We applied the 68 per cent 
prevention factor to the 53 deaths private sector deaths in this sector, for a predicted 
prevention of 36 fatalities per year.  With FAT/CAT and NTOF data, we looked at 
electrical deaths in those industries.  With CFOI we looked both at all deaths and at only 
those deaths due to contact with electric current.  Figure 4 and 5 show essentially the 
same pattern.  Deaths and death rates dipped in 1993, the year the standard became 
effective, then went back to their pre-standard levels through 1997.  From 1997 to 1999, 
CFOI reports that electrical fatalities fell from 25 to 12 and total fatalities fell from 44 to 
29.  Conclusions about the impact of the standard depend partly upon how we interpret 
the spike upward in 1997 in the CFOI data and whether we pay more attention to the 
deaths due to contact with electric current or to all deaths.  None of the 3 data sources 
suggest any decline in the electrical fatality rate after the effective date of this standard.  
                                                 
2 OSHA made several additional adjustments in its final baseline.  It eliminated deaths among municipal 
utilities in state-plan states.  It reduced deaths in SIC 493 to reflect the fact that one-fourth of the 
employment there worked in gas, not electric, utilities.  Adding in electrical contractors (9.4 deaths), line-
clearance tree-trimmers (8.6), and non-utility establishments (6.8) raised the total baseline to 85.5. (See 





We spoke with one individual from the Edison Electric Institute to inquire 
whether there had been developments in the industry which might have offset some of the 
preventive effects of the OSHA standards.  Our respondent was not aware of any major 
developments of this nature.
3 
Clearly there has not been a decline commensurate with OSHA’s 68% projected 
drop.  We lack a strong evaluation design for this standard, but, if the standard had been 
effective, we probably should have expected to see declines appearing earlier than 1998, 
5 years after the standard became effective.  
 
Logging Operations 
The Logging Operations standard was promulgated in 1994 and became effective 
in February 1995.  It expanded the set of issues covered by OSHA’s existing standard for 
logging.  OSHA reported in the Preamble to the standard that 6 states – California, 
Washington, Oregon, Michigan, Alaska, and Hawaii – had “adopted standards which 
provide more protection than OSHA’a [pre-existing] pulpwood logging standards by 
covering all logging operations within their States.  The standards of the five western 
states also contain a much higher level of detail and specification than either the 1978 
ANSI logging standard or OSHA’s pulpwood logging standard.”  In its Preliminary 
Regulatory Impact document (1988), OSHA observed that the annual cost per firm to 
comply with the new standard “ranges from $27 in California, where firms are at a high 
level of compliance with their own state standard, to $452 in the South.”  On this basis, 
we would expect to find that the new standard would have bigger effects among the 44 
states which had not had their own standards.  We compare the two groups of states with 
respect to the number of logging fatalities and fatality rate per 1000 logging employees. 
OSHA estimated that the baseline number of fatalities in SIC 241 was 158 and 
that compliance with the standard would reduce this number to 47, a 70% reduction.  As 
in most other cases, OSHA did not provide a timeline for these effects.  It was not clear if 
they would occur almost immediately following the effective date or if they would occur 
only after several years.  
Figure 6 shows the number of deaths reported by CFOI for all states as well as 
separately for the 6 states where OSHA believed the standard would have less effect and 
                                                 





for the 44 states where it claimed that there would have more effect.  In Figure 7, we have 
converted these fatality numbers into fatality rates for these three categories based upon 
employment figures from County Business Patterns.  Thus, 158 fatalities among the 
58,591 workers employed in SIC 241 in 1992 in the states covered by the standard 
translates to a baseline fatality rate of 2.70 per thousand and a projected fatality rate of 
0.80 per thousand. 
Several points about these Figures are worth noting. 
 
1)  Although deaths dropped in the affected states from 1992 to 1994, prior to the 
promulgation of the standard, they remained essentially constant in the period 
from 1994 through 1999.   
2)  Looking at fatality rates in Figure 7, we see that the national rate was quite stable. 
Moreover, the fatality rate in the 6 less affected states, already relatively low, 
dropped more than the rate in the other states. 
3)   Based on these figures, it seems that there has been no sizable drop in deaths 
since the new standard took effect.  Based on the figures in the less affected 
states, it seems unlikely that some other factor was pushing deaths rates up in a 
way that would mask the true preventive effect of the standard.  The rate has not 
been getting closer to the projected fatality number or rate. 
 
We also spoke with two individuals familiar with the logging industry to find out 
whether there were important factors at work during this p eriod that might have 
counteracted the preventive effects of the new standard.
4  Instead, both indicated that the 
major change had been a growth in the use of mechanized cutting and trimming 
procedures, a change which should have reduced fatalities further.  OSHA appears to 
have been overoptimistic in projecting that the logging operations standard would prevent 
111 deaths per year.  
 
                                                 
4 Steve Jarvis, Director of Forest Programs, Forest Resources Association; and Robert H. Shaffer, Professor 






  The scaffold standard, effective in November 1996, applied to the construction 
industry.  Here we looked at fatalities coded by CFOI as “falls from scaffolds”, 
FAT/CATs with the keyword of “scaffold” and NTOF-reported deaths with ICD9 E-code 
881.1, “fall from scaffolding”.  The provision for employees erecting and dismantling 
scaffolds took effect in September 1997. 
The 1996 scaffolding standard projected annual costs of $12.6 million per year.  
Over $5 million was for training workers who use scaffolds or erect or dismantle them.  
Almost $6 million was for scaffold inspection and about $1.5 million was for fall 
protection for erectors and dismantlers.  Except for one provision dealing with fall 
protection for scaffold erectors and dismantlers, the standard’s effective date was 
November 29, 1996. 
OSHA’s “Final Economic Analysis” relied for its baseline on the 1994 CFOI 
finding that there had been 79 scaffold-related deaths in that year.   Based upon a review 
of FAT/CATs in 1995, OSHA identified 51 scaffold deaths.  It judged that 33% of these 
would have been prevented by compliance with the existing standard.  It also judged that 
all of those plus an additional 59% would have been prevented by full compliance with 
the new standard.   Only 8%, 4 of the 51, were judged non-preventable.  OSHA applied 
these percentages to the 1994 CFOI total of 79 scaffold deaths, leading to the projection 
that 26 deaths could have been prevented by full compliance with the existing standard 
and an additional 47 by full compliance with the new standard.   
The standard is not limited to preventing falls from scaffolds; some provisions 
deal  with preventing falling objects from injuring workers on scaffolds; others with 
avoiding contact with electrical current.  However, the CFOI report showed that 72 
(91%) of the 79 scaffold-related deaths in 1994 were due to falls from scaffolds.
5  For 
that  reason, we used that category of falls from scaffolds to track the effects of the 
standard.   If we apply the 59% reduction factor to the 72 fatal falls from scaffolds, we 
get a projected reduction of 42 deaths.
6  
                                                 
5 The percentage of scaffold deaths that were not due to falls from the scaffold was higher in the OSHA 
FAT/CAT data. 
6  The BLS website gives a total of 68 deaths in 1994 for “fall from scaffold, staging”, CFU20116X8E, , 






Figure 8 shows that the number of these deaths was only 4 lower in 2000 than it 
had been in 1996.   However, when we adjust for changes in the number of construction 
workers, we see in Figure 9 that there was a 21% decline in the fatality rate for falls from 
scaffolds from 1996 to 2000.  The variability in these rates should lead us to avoid heavy 
reliance on any particular year-to-year comparison.  Again, however, it seems clear that 
the decline in the number and rate for deaths due to falls from scaffolds in 2000 remained 
much smaller than the level projected by OSHA when the standard was promulgated in 
1996.  Again, we asked a long-time scaffold consultant whether there had been major 
developments which might have offset the preventive effects of the standard and received 
a negative response.
7 
Figure 8 shows that the number of these deaths was only 4 lower in 2000 than it 
had been in 1996.   However, when we adjust for changes in the number of construction 
workers, we see in Figure 9 that there was a 21% decline in the fatality rate for falls from 
scaffolds from 1996 to 2000.  The variability in these rates should lead us to avoid heavy 
reliance on any particular year-to-year comparison.  Again, however, it seems clear that 
the decline in the number and rate for deaths due to falls from scaffolds in 2000 remained 
much smaller than the level projected by OSHA when the standard was promulgated in 
1996.  Again, we asked a long-time scaffold consultant whether there had been major 





In Table III, we summarize our findings about the accuracy of a) the baseline 
number of fatalities; b) the percentage of those deaths that will be prevented (the 
prevention factor); and c) the overall estimate of the number of deaths prevented, which 
is a function of the first two.  In the earlier standards the baseline numbers were usually 
overestimated, but subsequent use of CFOI has led to greater accuracy.  Prevention 
factors were always overestimated as well the total projections of the number of deaths 
prevented. 
                                                 
7 Dave Glabe, Secretary of the Scaffold Industry Association 





We need to keep in mind that the long-term trend in work fatalities and fatality 
rates has been downward.  Economic incentives to prevent injuries and technological 
changes that embody safer technologies have played a role, along with regulation.  Thus 
even when we do find declines in fatalities, the changes may not be the result of the new 
standards.  Somewhat paradoxically, the only case where we found clear evidence of 
technological changes that were believed to be safety-enhancing was for logging, where 
we see no evidence of any decline in fatalities. 
   Why has OSHA usually overestimated the effects?  One point that OSHA staff 
emphasized in response to these findings was that the figures they produce should not be 
viewed as “predictions;” rather, they are estimates of what the impact would be if there 
were full compliance with the standard.   
 
The Issue of Full Compliance 
OSHA staff is well aware that there is not full compliance with OSHA standards.  
However, despite its lack of realism, the assumption of full compliance seems generally 
reasonable given the task that the regulatory analysts face.  OSHA is required by statute 
to demonstrate that its standards are technologically and economically feasible, and this 
demonstration must be made under the assumption that there is full compliance.  And if 
costs are estimated under this assumption, then calculations of the benefits these costs 
would generate should use it as well.  
However, there is a point at which the full compliance assumption does go 
beyond reasonableness.  OSHA appears to assume that if a standard requires workers to 
avoid working in a hazardous manner or provides them training to change their 
behaviors, then all such unsafe behavior will be eliminated.  This assumption creates the 
potential for estimating unrealistically large reductions in injuries.  When training and 
work practices are major components of a standard, OSHA should be required to analyze 
their impacts in a more deliberative and realistic fashion. 
But this admonition is a rather empty one in the absence of better scientific 
understanding.  For example, what can we expect to result from training?   What 
percentage of those trained can be expected to change particular types of behavior?  





weak commitment to research, even research applied directly to its mission, has not 
served it well here. 
OSHA has an incentive to make new standards it proposes look as attractive as 
possible.  The agency invests a good deal of effort and prestige in standard-setting and 
wants to convince others that the standards are worthwhile and that the agency is 
contributing to worker health.  The plausibility of the analysis can be scrutinized by both 
OIRA and by the courts.  When such scrutiny is lacking, it is likely that the pressures to 
make the analysis cogent are weaker.  Standards with expected costs below $100 million 
per year are not required to prepare RIAs and OMB is not required to review them.  
Typically, safety standards are cheaper than health standards, and less likely to be 
challenged and reviewed in the courts.  Therefore, the small safety standards which 
comprise the bulk of our sample may represent the least well-justified analyses of 
impacts.  Our small sample is not adequate to provide a strong test, but it is suggestive 
that Table III indicates that the most accurate projection was for the $200 million per year 
confined spaces standard, while the least accurate was for the $12 million per year 
logging operations standard 
Systematic errors about the preventive effects of new standards can distort the 
agency’s understanding in ways that cause harm.  If a new standard is projected to 
prevent 8 5% of the deaths caused by a hazard, and the other 15% are judged 
“unpreventable,” then it would appear to make little sense to give further attention to that 
hazard other than to enforce the standard.  But if the true effect is closer to 20% than 
85%, the diagnosis might be quite different. If we erroneously think we are preventing a 
large number of injuries and deaths, we may become less likely to make serious efforts 
that really would prevent the deaths in question. 
For the objective of producing more accurate estimates, we need to inquire further 
into the factors that generate bad estimates and into what, if anything, might be done 
about them.  The magnitude of the predicted effect is a function of two factors:  the 
baseline estimate and the “prevention factor” (i.e., the percentage of the baseline numbers 
that OSHA believes will be prevented). 
We saw in several cases that the baseline selected by OSHA appeared to be too 
high.  Prior to the establishment of CFOI, OSHA lacked a good source of data about 





and clearly underreported deaths, especially at small establishments, which have the 
highest death rates.   OSHA and its contractors often relied on making adjustments to the 
FAT/CAT numbers.  We found extrapolations that ranged from 1.5 to 2.25 for 
establishing the baseline.  Based on the limited comparison we did for the electrical work 
practices standard, the low end of that range was probably more appropriate.  Now that 
the CFOI is available, overestimates of the baseline appear to be less of a problem. CFOI 
is a more accurate data system because it reviews more sources of information (reducing 
the number of missed cases) and because it requires multiple sources to verify each death 
(reducing the number of false positives).  In addition, it collects information about each 
death that allows better identification of the industry and of causal factors. 
  More troubling are the estimates of the “prevention factor.”  In general, we found 
little persuasive evidence provided to justify OSHA’s calculations.  In a number of cases, 
there are circular references to the “prevention factors” used for other standards, implying 
that if it was plausible there, it should be plausible h ere as well.  For example, OSHA 
applied an 80 % effectiveness rate for the reduction of baseline fatalities and injuries in 
the RIA of the Process Safety Management standard because (p.v-7) “the prevention rate 
is consistent with sensitivity analysis estimates used in previous regulatory analyses like 
the electrical work practices standard, lockout/tagout standard and confined spaces 
standard.”  
When a serious effort was made to estimate the effect, it generally relied upon a 
review of the FAT/CAT database. Reviewers would try to answer the question of whether 
the provisions of the new standard would have prevented the fatalities which occurred in 
affected workplaces.  Unfortunately, these judgments are not easy to make and depend 
greatly on the assumptions that the reviewer brings to the task.  The case of training 
provisions, cited above, is probably the most egregious example.  Although OSHA does 
often cite experiences at individual establishments, which often report dramatic 
reductions, it makes no effort to assess the representativeness of those experiences.  In 
contrast, there were no references to any effort to evaluate the effects on injuries in states 
that had adopted similar standards in earlier years, which would potentially seem to 
provide the most valid basis for projecting effects.  In fairness, however, we should note 





We should note that in one of its more recent standards, for Powered Industrial 
Truck Operator Training, issued in December 1998, OSHA stated that it “had adopted a 
more conservative methodology for estimating the number of fatalities and injuries that 
could be prevented by the final standard.” (OSHA, 1998)  There it projected that only 11 
of the annual toll of  101 industrial truck-related fatalities would be prevented by the 
standard.  However, because OSHA also acknowledged that “about 75% of affected 
establishments currently provide training that is equivalent, or nearly equivalent, to that 
required by the final standard, the degree of conservatism may be less than that implied 
by OSHA. 
An important issue is to what extent overestimates of the prevention factor occur 
because the standard really was not very effective and to what extent it occurred because 
employers did not comply with it.  Both probably play some role, but the relative 
importance matters because the implications for policy could be quite different.  Stronger 
enforcement could be called for if noncompliance dominates, but might not be 
appropriate if compliance had little preventive value.  Unfortunately, we are not able to 
provide further insight here. 
Finally, it seems clear that more attention needs to be focused on the problems of 
predicting the effects of new safety standards on non-fatal injuries.  Here, it turns out that 
some of the more insightful analyses were found in older, not newer, RIAs.  The reason 
was that they utilized data sources that OSHA and the BLS discontinued in the late 
1980s.  One of these, labeled Work Injury Reports, came from a program that followed-
back a sample of injured workers to learn more about events related to their injuries.  The 
Department of Labor should consider restoring this program or find other methods for 
obtaining better data.  One method that might be considered would be to “piggy-back” a 
team of analysts onto 1 or 2 state WC data programs.  OSHA could identify a set of 
hazards that it was thinking of setting new standards for.  The analysts would review 
injury reports related to those hazards.  Specifically, they might follow-back (by 
telephone or through visits) to learn the details of the injuries--e.g., the specific 
equipment involved, the level of training, the use of personal protective equipment-–in 





The importance of developing better sources of data and devoting resources to 
analyzing them deserves a high priority.  OSHA and other safety agencies face difficult 
analytic challenges in projecting what the consequences of new rules will be. 
Some of the limitations of this study must be emphasized.  First, we did not 
include standards where OSHA had predicted that only a small number of fatalities 
would be prevented.  The pattern in those cases might be different.  Second, our 
evaluation designs are usually not strong enough to make precise estimates.  For 
example, when we find no evidence of a decline, it seems reasonable to rule out a 70% 
decline, but not necessarily a 10% or 20% decline.  Third, although we made some effort 
to look at other factors affecting changes in the number of deaths, we generally did not 
fully examine developments in the affected industries that might have influenced 
outcomes.   
Although our findings are relevant to examining the number of deaths, if  any, 
prevented by the OSHA standards, it should also be kept in mind that this is not the topic 
of our study.  Rather, our topics have been whether OSHA’s projections of the impact of 
its standards have been accurate, the reasons for errors, and possible remedies.  
  We should emphasize that these standards may well be justified on economic grounds 
even if the number of deaths prevented is much lower than projected.  In recent 
standards, the Environmental Protection Agency has been using a valuation of over $6 
million per death prevented and the Department of Transportation, $3 million.
9  At these 
rates, even a small number of deaths prevented could justify many of the standards we 
review here.  
                                                 
9 Personal communication from John F. Morrall, III, Office of Information and Regulatory Analaysis, U.S. 







Hahn, Robert W. 1996.  “Regulatory Reform:  What Do the Government’s Numbers Tell Us?”  
In: Hahn RW, editor. Risks, Costs and Lives Saved.  .New York: Oxford University Press. 
p 208-254. 
 
Harrington W, Morgenstern RD, Nelson P. 2000.  “On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost 
Estimates.”  Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 19:297-322. 
 
Heinzerling, L. 1998. “Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions.” Yale Law Journal. 107:1981-
2070. 
 
Marsh SM, Layne LA.  2001.  “Fatal Injuries to Civilian Workers in the United States, 1980-
1995.”  DHHS/NIOSH Pub. No. 2001-1295. 
  
Mendeloff, John M.  1988.  The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation. MIT Press: 
Cambridge. p 53-72. 
 
Mendeloff, John M.  2003. “Regulatory Approaches to Preventing Workplace Injury.”  In: 
Sullivan T, Franks JW, eds.  Reducing Work-Related Disability:  A Reader.  London:  
Taylor and Francis. 
 
Morrall, John F., III. 1986. “A Review of the Record.”  Regulation, November-December, 1986. 
 
National Research Council. 1987.  “Counting Injuries and Illnesses in the Workplace:  Proposals 
for a Better System.”  Washington, D.C.:  National Academy Press.   
 
Suruda A, Whitaker B, Bloswick D, Phillips P, Sesek R. 2002. “Impact of the OSHA Trench and 
Excavation Standard on Fatal Injury in the Construction Industry.”  J Occup Environ Med 
44:902-5. 
 
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. 1995. “Gauging Control Technology and 
Regulatory Impacts in Occupational Safety and Health:  An Appraisal of OSHA’s 
Analytic Approach.” Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 
 
U.S. Department of Commerce, County Business Patterns. 2002. www.census.com.  
 
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.  1994.  “Fatal workplace injuries in 1992:  
a collection of data and analysis.”  Washington, DC:  U.S. Government Printing Office, 
BLS Report 870. 
 
U.S. Department of  Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.  2003.  Census of Fatal Occupational 
Injuries. www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfoil.htm. 
 







U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 1987. “Preliminary 
Regulatory Impact and Regulatory Analysis of the Proposed Electrical 
Safety-Related Work Practices Standard for General Industry” (29 CFR 1910, Subpart S).  
 
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 1988. “Preliminary 
Regulatory Impact Analysis of the Revisions to the Pulpwood Logging Standard” (29 
CFR 1910.266). 
  
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration.  1992.  “Final 
Regulatory Impact and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis of the Final Standard for Process 
Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals” (Section 1910.119, Subpart H) 
 
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 1992. “Final 
Regulatory Impact and Regulatory Flexibility Analysis of the Permit-Required Confined 
Spaces Standard” (29 CFR Part 1910.246). 
 
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration.1993. “Final 
Economic Analysis of the Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution 
Standard” (29 CFR Part 1910.146). 
 
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 1994. “Regulatory 
Impact Analysis for the Revisions to the Pulpwood Logging Standard” (29 CFR 
1910.266). 
 
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 1996. “Final 
Economic Analysis of OSHA’s Final Rule for Scaffolds in the Construction Industry” (29 
CFR 1926.450-454). 
 
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration.  1998.  Powered 
Industrial Truck Operator Training.  63 FR 66237. 
 
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 2000. Section 610 
and Executive Order 12886 Review of the Control of Hazardous Energy Sources 
(Lockout/Tagout) Standard 29 CFR 1910.147.  
 
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 2003. “Regulatory 
Review of OSHA’s Grain Handling Facilities Standard.”  
 
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 2003.  Accident 








Table I.   Safety Standards Promulgated Since 1990 
 
Date of Federal 
Register 
Title  Effective date 
8/6/1990  Electrical safety related work practices  12/4/1990  
(with exception 8/6/1991) 
11/14/1990  Safety standards for stairways and ladders used 
in the construction industry 
1/14/1991 
2/24/1991 
Process safety management of highly 
hazardous chemicals; explosives and blasting 
agents 
5/26/1992 
1/14/1993  Permit-required confined spaces  4/15/1993 
1/31/1994  Electric power generation, transmission, and 
distribution; electrical protective equipment 
5/31/94  
(with exception 1/31/95) 
8/9/1994  Safety standards for fall protection in the 
construction industry 
2/6/1995 
10/12/1994  Logging operation  2/9/1995 
8/30/1996  Safety standards for scaffolds used in the 
construction industry 
11/29/1996  
(except with OMB Control 
number) 
7/25/1997  Longshoring and marine terminals  1/21/1998 
12/1/1998  Permit-required confined spaces modification  2/1/1999 

























Table II. Costs and Effects of the Standards in this Study 
 
Estimate of Effects  Title of the 
standard 
Affected 
Industry  Cost estimate 
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Table III.  The Accuracy of the Projections of Deaths Prevented by New OSHA 
Safety Standards 
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Adjusted FAT/CAT GI except
SICs 491 &493
CFOI GI except SICs 491 &
493
FAT/CAT GI except SICs 491
& 493
NTOF 925.2 & 925.9 effective in December 1990
projected = 138
Adjusted FAT/CAT
1) For adjustment for missing state 
data, see Data section of paper 2) For 
reporting adjustment, increase 25 % 
for each year.
FAT/CAT:   From 1985 to 1996, 
Keyword - electrical
CFOI: From 1992 to 2000, Event code: 
Contact with electric current (31X) 
NTOF: From 1980 to 1997, ICD9 E-
code 925.2 (Industrial wiring, 
appliances and electrical machinery) 
and 925.9 (Unspecified electrical 
current which includes burns or other 
injuries from electric current, electric 
shock, and electrocution)
Baseline: 235












































CFOI - 47 states
CFOI - 3 states
FAT/CAT
From 1985 to 1995
All states
All industries except 
construction and government
Keyword: explosion or fire
CFOI
From 1992 to 2000
Event code: 50,510,511,519, 
520, 522, 529, 341, 3412 
(except confined spaces)
SICs: 1321, 20-39, 4221, 49, 
50, 51
3 States: CA, DE, NJ
Baseline: 330
Projected:  198 in first 5 
years (40% prevention) and 
66 in next 5 years (80 % 
prevention)
Figure 2. Process Safety Management - Fatalities












































CFOI - 44 States
FAT/CAT - 44 States
CFOI - 6 states
effective in January 1993
baseline
6 States: 
CA, KY, MD, MI, NJ, VA
FAT/CAT




From 1992 to 2000
Event code: Inhalation in 
enclosed, restricted, or 
confined spaces (3411) and 
Depletion of oxygen in 
enclosed, restricted, or space 
(384)
SICs: 13 and 20-99
Baseline:  64



















































effective in May 1994
16.4
FAT/CAT
From 1985 to 1996
Keyword - electrical
CFOI
From 1992 to 2000
Event code - 
all or contact with electric 
current (310, 312, 313, 
314, 319)
NTOF
Total fatalities for SICs 
491 and 493 and ICD9 E-
code 925.1 (Electric 
power generation plants, 
Distribution stations, 
transmission lines)
Baseline  - 53 (from 
CFOI, 1992)



























Figure 5. Electric Power Generation - Fatality Rate per Million 


















CFOI  all fatalities
FAT/CAT  electrical
CFOI  contact with
electric current
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Keyword - electrical
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All or Contact with 
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Total fatalities for SICs 
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Baseline: 2.7 = 
158/58.591 (44 
states, 1992)
Projected: 0.8 = 
































































































































Event code - fall from 
scaffold, staging (116) 
in Construction Industry
NTOF:




Baseline: 14.6 = 
79/5.418 (1996)
Projected: 5.9 = 
32/5.418 (1996)
projected
 